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autobiographical project. Rather than presenting the truth of the seIf-
for example, a self named ''Louis Althusser"-the work offers us a
conflicted dynamic with no clear uniting principle. Presciendy
anticipating the misreading of someone like Christopher Hitchens,
who takes the self-denunciation in Althusser's book as evidence that
the entire reuvre is rotten, Montag stresses that the naive crirical project
committed to the defense of the bourgeois subject is fated to judge an
autobiography rather than to read it, hence, to mistake this book's
critique of subjectivism for the breakdown of a particular individual's
authority.
Althusser described the beginning of the 1990s as "a time when
Marxism is declared dead and buried" (125). Since this time is still very
much our time, it is crucial to remember that the effort to map the
logics of contemporary culture is oolyone dimensionof the progressive
project. In abrief conclusion, Montag argues that while the object of
criticallabor is to "produce knowledge," such an endeavor is always in
part an acquisition of knowledge about the limits of knowledge, hence,
it is equally achallenge to the explanatory authority of any given
epistemological or bistol1cal paradigm (134). In working on Althusser,
then, "it is possible ... that we will contribute not only to a knowledge
of the social world, but to its transformation, which is, after all, that to
wbich Althusser devoted bis life" (135). We can only hope that
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Rarely did Montaigne's resdess attention pause long enough for
reflection to wrest itself free from the immediacy of lived experience.
Where modern philosophy; with Descartes, is born out of an almost
ascetic refusal of our worldly being, the Essqys can ttace their 011ginS
back to the contingent and concrete givens of personal existence.
Montaigne is interested only in bis manners, bis moeurs, bis ways of
102
BOOK REVIEWS
being and having a self. If we recognize apart of ourselves in the
portrait he has etched in words, trus is because he writes against the
background of that mysterious yet familiar sense of our shared
humanity-I'humaine condition. Without trus background philosophy,
and all inquiry for that matter, would cease to be intelligible. But does
introducing the ambiguity and opacity of the private impression into
the very heart of thought not liquefy the very attempt to formalize the
essay through the labor ,of conceptual understanding? Can the essay
withstand philosophical appropriation and still remain an open-ended
and partial knowledge of individual phenomena? If so, what remains
of philosophy?
This formidable nexus of questions is the foeus of a new book
by Ann Hartle. Her Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher is
noteworthy in that it does not tread the wen-worn path of the literary
or topical piece. Montaigne's singularly expressive genius has ensured
that he will never want for these sorts of crearive foragings. Instead,
Hartle has taken up the invitation extended by that masterful reader of
the Esst9's, Hugo Friedrich, namely, to "provide a philosophical
interpretation of Montaigne's thought" (2). The dearth of similar
attempts testifies to the intrinsic difficulty of the project: as Adorno,
Lukacs, and many others have recognized, the essay rebukes the
totalizing impulse that in modem philosophy has given the pensee de
survol or the "system" an absolute and determining value. The
skepticism that crystallizes in the '~pology for Raymond Sebond," for
many the only philosophically relevant issue in the Essqys, is less an
intellectual stance than the logical outcome ofan unyielding fidelity to
the experienced moment. To be mindful of the itinerant character of
Montaigne's consciousness and yet to seek therein for an order of
unity and principle that extends beyond the personal scope of the
observations-these are the twin scales whose balance is vital if the
EsstD's and philosophy are to be brought into any sort of producrive
rapprochement.
Ho~ then, does Harde fare in this most difficult of syntheses?
To her credit, the decision to take Montaigne at his word and follow
him as he plumbs his natural faculties as an "unpremeditated and
accidental philosopher" (11) is asound one. What is an "accidental"
philosopher? To begin with, "accidental" has nothing in common
with its usually passive connotation. Montaigne did not by chance
discover that he possessed an intuitive facility for philosophical
reflection. He was hardly a latecomer to the writings of the ancients.
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'~ccidenta1" does not qualify a specific historical event in Montaigne's
life, as if one could even be so foolish as to determine the moment
when the right to participate in the "conversation of mankind" was
granted. To practice philosophy in an "accidental" manner is to follow
the Socratic counsel to "Know thyselt:" and in this sense the EssC9's are
attentive to the same inspiration that brought Descartes to explore the
depths of the cogito. However-and here Hartle is entirely correct in
her emphasis-what accounts for the affinity between the essay and
Montaigne's "accidental" philosophyis the latter's grounding in human
custom, habit, and opinion-all pretheoretical modes ofunderstanding
and response. As she writes, "accidental philosophy is completely and
radically human" (37). In direct contrast, "deliberate" philosophy (a
term coined by Harde to refer to the express value given to the discipline
of the self in ancient philosoph)', e.g., the annihilation of the passions
in the ideal figure of the Stoic sage) tends to forget the specific being
of the human subject (29). Where it places the philosopher under the
"rule of reason" (27), enforcing a conformity of thought and behavior
according to "precepts of philosophy" far removed from the everyday
world (27), "accidental" thinking places an irreducible ontological value
on contingency and possibility (160). In one of the late essays
Montaigne writes ofhis distaste for the "transcendental humors" that
goad men into believing that the divine essence of humanity should
have nothing commonplace about it (32). '~ccidental" philosophy
begins in the bistorical time and place of the individual, coordinates of
facticity that situate reflection in the already meaningful but not thetic
or thematized world. If this is the path that speculative inquiry must
take to meet the essay on its own terms, what, then, of rationality and
truth? Does "accidental" philosophy necessarily invoke a radical
skepticism? Is there room for a metaphysics in the crowded and noisy
life that is the setting and substance for Montaigne's venture into
himself?
There is, but first the classical categories of metaphysics must be
made to reflect the radical emphasis that Montaigne places on the
utterly human ("human, an too human," as Nietzsche willlater say in a
similar vein of observation) birthplace of all ideas. For Hartle there is
in the EssC9's a metap11ysics, as Montaigne is throughout engaged in a
critical dialogue with the canonical arguments, in the writings of
Aristotle, Plato, and Aquinas, that have formed and informed the
philosophical mind. When he writes in the last and penultimate essay
"Of Experience" that he is bis own "metaphysics and physics," one
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ought to read this declaration with all the gravity of insight warranted
by Montaigne's familiarity with and sophisticated negotiation (through
the practice of quotation, the dialectical movement of perspective) of
the wisdom of the ancients. The horizons of significance are not
merely rhetorical but are in their deepest reaches, for Hartle, eminently
philosophical. Consonant with the central function and narrow scope
of his self-observation, however, such traditional metaphysical
categories as "being and becoming, nature, causality, and the universal
and the particular" (40) must have their meaning reflected through the
form of the individual's life. In effeet, Montaigne "lowers" or ''weakens''
(61) the terms of metaphysics so as to bring them in line with bis
localized self-understancling. Whatever knowledge can be captured
through these notions, it is clear that it must be grounded in that
openness to the possible and faithfulness to common opinion that
distinguish the essay as a style of saturated thinking. "Thought," writes
Harde in a pithy summary of Montaigne's philosopbical position, "is
not a mode ofbeing that escapes the human condition: thought is the
human condition" (152). The essay has metaphysical significance in
that it seeks to discover how it is that thought can emerge from
experience and bind itself together into enduring forms of
understanding capable of expressing truth. Far from a wholesale denial
of metaphysics, there is in the Essqys a very contemporary recognition,
for Hartle almost Heideggerian, of the need to quesrion Being from
the world as it is already lived (153). If the reflecrion on Being is
grounded in our modes of worldly comportment, our maurs, then there
is no point in refusing Montaigne a philosophical credit simply because
he never refused to avail himself of the thorny ambiguity of existence.
'~ccidental" philosophy in this sense joins with the general trend (10
pl1enomenolo~ existentialism, criticaltheo~ deconstruction, etc.) away
from the certain and absolute-i.e., non-differentiated-possession
of Being in or by consciousness. Sufficiently humbled, consciousness
becomes again the place for registering that shock of experience wbich,
in the guise of wonder (J), is the very genesis of philosophical activity.
In the course of this review I have made little mention of the
enormous significance of the lived body for Montaigne. This is not
by accident. The emphasis on contingency and the consequent need
to rethink the grounds and scope of philosopbical reflection along the
lines of the essay form, as Hartle has done in this book, is deserving
of praise. Yet, noticeably missing from her argument is an awareness
of (or at the very least a significant emphasis on) the body as the very
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fulcrum and anvil for all of Montaigne's reflections on the human
condition. The return to the senses as primary modes of our "lowly"
being is one of the pivotal and overriding themes of the Essqys. When
Montaigne writes in "On some verses of Virgil" that he has furnished
the reader with "essays in flesh and bone," the boundaries between the
metaphorical and the literal content of the observation are profoundly
and purposefully blurred. He means to restore to thought its sensitive
origins, as it is the wayward body and its movements of affect and
desire that gives contingency its basal value. To locate the begiruUngs
of reflection in opinionand custom is an important step toward bringing
the Essays into the field of post-Cartesian inquiry. However-and I
suspect that the influence of Heidegger is responsible for this
oversight----our worldly forms of comportment have an undeniably
embodied aspect. If there is a criticism of Heidegger's hermeneutics
ofDasein (at the time ofBeing and Time), it is that there is almost no role
played by the body. This is the objection levied by the French
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example; but the point
applies equally to the effort at making experience strictly a matter of
custom and habit (153) and not one also of our sensory involvement
with the world. (For further detailed discussions of trus point, one can
turn to the phenomenological studies of Erwin Straus, or the works
on Montaigne by Jean Starobinski and GiseIe Mathieu-Castellani.)
Hartle recognizes that there is a strong fidelity to sensory perception
on Montaigne's part: ''In terms of the Aristotelian ladder from sense
perception up to the "first philosophy:' Montaigne remains close to
the bottom: "experience is lowand common" (153). But the "sense
data of the empiricist" (153), which Hartle bluntly rejects as having
any bearing on "accidental" philosophy, is not the only understanding
of the senses available; nor need one entirely dispose of the empiricist's
salutary awareness of the need to zero in on external impressions as
evidence to be used against the "clear and distinct" standard for
philosophical reflection. In thewritings of Merleau-Pon~ again, Hartle
would have found a considerably more nuanced rejection of the claims
of the empiricist position-one, however, that would have saved
sensory perception as an original way of disclosing the worldly,
contingent, arnbiguous-"accidental"-aspects of thought.
The absence of a more thorough account of the role played by
the body and Montaigne's great fascination with its natural faculties
helps explain why Hartle is able to find in the Essays a worldview that
is grounded in Christianity and ·the faith of the believer. Above all else,
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trus is perhaps the most ambitious and contentious claim in the book:
that Montaigne upholds the doctrine of Christian theology: This move
is made easier given the fact that minus the deepened understanding
of out' embodiment, a radical turn of events that unfolds for Montaigne
largely in Book 111 and which takes place against the background of
the recovery of Nature as the logos or ground for human existence,
there is needed an ontological support for the contingencyof the human
condition. This support, for Hartle, is expressed in the belie~attributed
to Montaigne, that not only is the world the creation of God but the
world itself is "incarnational" (164). "lncarnation" is the idea that
"God is present in and revealed in the world" (164). Rejecting the
readings of Montaigne that position him as either an atheist or a skeptic-
fideist, the turn to the "Christian pretheoretical beginnings" (136) of
the world, believes Hartle (who imports the interpretation of religious
faith from the writings of the philosopher Michael Oakeshott), is a
sufficient basis to shore up the "being of contingency" (172) as weIl as
provide a unique insight into the political extensions of Montaigne's
"accidental" philosoph~ Montaigne's standpoint on matters of religion
has long been a matter of dispute. Through the move to recover the
revealed beingof the world within Christianity, Hartle means to secure
for religion a foundational place in Montaigne's self-portrait. As she
writes, "the role of religion for Montaigne is not utilitarian but rather
ontologically foundational and essential" (234).
By making the overall trajectory of the book into one of agradual
unfolding of the religious thesis, some of the figures Hartle uses to
such good effect in the opening stages of her analysis seem, in hindsight,
to be pressed into service for an end they would not otherwise support.
Adorno, Lukacs, and Merleau-Ponty would hardly subscribe to the
kind of religious consciousness that Hartle sees flowering in the Essqys.
All of them were decidedly committed to the historical world and the
creation ofhistorical meaning and significance through the actions of
individuals. While each would agree with Montaigne that reason is
more often than not merely foolishness dressed up in an appealing
form, none would subordinate politics to religion as Hartle would have
Montaigne do. Montaigne's was in all events a worldly consciousness--
to question himself and the world as he does is a display of a faith, but
it is a faith and a humanism anchored in the terrestrla1, not the celestial.
This remains the opening premise and conclusion of the Essqys. Hartle
has certainly elevated the terms of the discussion surrounding the
philosophical merits of the Essqys, and in parts her work must be
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reckoned with. To expect the last and final word from such an
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What was important in this ehoiee of terms ['anti-
strategie1 was to make clear how deeply we must
loeate the inversion of perspeetives neeessary to
answer the call that we reeeive: we must displace the
eall, we must eall in return upon the Americans to
think. in different terms, we must question the very
presuppositions of the demands. We must start
changing the concept of thepoliticaL (233)
Etienne Balibar's philosophieally rigorous and politieally topieal
assemblage of nine translated, revised lectures and two essays delivered
or written between 1991 and 2002, will be extremely useful to those in
the fields of politieal philosophy, eontemporary history, European
histo~ cultural studies, and soeiology, to name only a few; and should
indeed top the reading lists of anyone interested in contemporary
debates on eitizenship, European unifieation, nationalism, the politics
of globalization, and the relationship between national and international
la~ The eolleetion prineipally eonsists of lectures addressed to
international audiences in the United States as wen as in both central
and peripheral "old" Europe. In these pieces, Balibar analyzes a variety
of loeal politieal struggles and erises in and on the borders of Europe,
such as the politieal sttuggles of the sans-papiers in Franee, which have
significantly eontributed to the demoeratization of national borders
and to a reaetivation of civil disobedienee at the heart of citizenship
participation. Such specifie issues situate Balibar's discussion of broader
transnational enses (erises of nationalism, as weIl as transnational forms
of mass violence) and his analysis of the dominant eoneeptual and
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